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Leon Battista Alberti and Marsilio Ficino, though separated by twenty-nine 
years in age, had a close relationship as mentor and pupil. Concepts which 
can be found in Alberti’s De pictura in 1435 and De re aedificatoria, or On 
the Art of Building, in 1450, are infused in Ficino’s De amore, or Commen-
tary on Plato’s Symposium on Love, in 1469. The concepts include Alberti’s 
theories of concinnitas, armonia, lineamenti, beauty, proportion, light, and 
vision. In both Alberti and Ficino, harmonies shared by the body and music 
are manifestations of the harmonies of the soul. Beauty in body and matter is 
determined by beauty in mind or mens, that part of mind directed toward in-
tellectus divinus, and beauty is made manifest in mind by the lineamenti, the 
lines in the mind which are distinguished from matter. Beauty is the internal 
perfection of the intellectus divinus, which is the Good, which is a perfect 
harmony called concinnitas. Ornament is not beauty, but rather a physical 
complement to beauty. 
      Ficino wrote that during his adolescence, he and the older Alberti became 
correspondents, as mentor and pupil. They became partners in a “ritual corre-
spondence,” and exchanged “noble wisdom and knowledge.”1 When Alberti 
returned to Florence from Rome in the 1460s, he stayed at Ficino’s house in 
Figline Valdarno. By 1468 he was recorded by Cristoforo Landino in the 
Disputations at Camaldoli as being active in discussions at the Academy. 
Landino, a friend of Alberti’s, decribed a meeting with him at the monastery 
at Camaldoli. Alberti arrived with Ficino, after he had stopped in Figline. 
Landino’s collection of Latin elegies in his Xandra of 1443 to 1458 was ded-
icated to Alberti. Several writers have pointed to the parallels between the 
ideas expressed by Alberti and Ficino, for example Joan Gadol in Leon Bat-
tista Alberti: Universal Man of the Early Renaissance, and George Hersey in 
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Pythagorean Palaces. Some writers have pointed to what they see as irrec-
oncilable and “systematic differences”2 between the aesthetics of the two 
thinkers, because of the “dominant idea of transcendence” in Ficino which is 
not in Alberti.  
      From Landino’s descriptions of conversations between Ficino and Al-
berti on the subject of Platonic philosophy, and Alberti’s many references to 
Plato and Socrates in his writings, it can be concluded that Alberti’s philoso-
phical values were influenced by Plato. As Arnaldo Della Torre described in 
Storia dell’Accademia Platonica di Firenze, “thus Plato, who not only relates 
but explains and broadens Socratic doctrine, is always named with special 
reverence in the works of Alberti, and his theories are always quoted with 
deferential respect.”3 The dialogues of Plato most quoted by Alberti are the 
Laws and the Republic, which was the first well-circulated book of Plato in 
the Renaissance, translated by Manuel Chrysolaras before 1400. The only 
text of Plato translated into Latin prior to that, which was available in Italy in 
the Middle Ages, was the Timaeus. Claims by writers that Alberti had no in-
terest in philosophy, let alone Platonic philosophy, must be discounted.4 
      I would like to suggest that Alberti knew the Enneads of Plotinus as well, 
perhaps as a result of a meeting with Georges Gemistos Plethon and Nicho-
las of Cusa at the Academy of Palestrina, and through the translation of the 
Enneads by Marius Victorinus, the fourth-century translation used by Augus-
tine, now lost, or even the extracts of the Enneads in the Theology of Aris-
totle. Alberti designed a sarcophagus for Georges Gemistos Plethon at the 
Church of San Francesco in Rimini. Gemistos Plethon was the leading Pla-
tonic scholar of the Byzantine Empire, who came to Florence from Mistras in 
Greece to introduce Italians to Plato, and he founded the Platonic Academy 
in Florence on behalf of Cosimo de’ Medici. Ficino was familiar with a Byz-
antine manuscript of the Enneads, codex Laurentianus 87.3, as early as 1460, 
and had the entire Greek text transcribed, codex Parisius graecus 1816. He 
began his translation of the Enneads in 1484, the year that he wrote the De 
amore. He revised the translation and added commentaries by 1490, and it 
was published in 1492. 
      In De re aedificatoria, Alberti defined beauty as concinnitas, which is “a 
harmony of all the parts…fitted together with such proportion and connec-
tion that nothing could be added, diminished, or altered for the worse” 
(VI.2).5 In Book IV Alberti explained, “In this we should follow Socrates’ 
advice, that something that can only be altered for the worse can be held to 
be perfect” (IV.2). Alberti followed Vitruvius in his definition of concinnitas 
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or beauty in De re aedificatoria: “It is the task and aim of concinnitas to 
compose parts that are quite separate from each other by their nature, accord-
ing to some precise rule, so that they correspond to one another in appear-
ance” (VII.4). Concinnitas is the regulating law of nature as applied to the 
arts, as in De re aedificatoria, “Everything that nature produces is regulated 
by the law of concinnitas” (IX.5), and “Neither in the whole body nor in its 
parts does concinnitas flourish as much as it does in Nature herself.” 
      Alberti’s definition of concinnitas is similar to the invocation by Al-
berti’s acquaintance Nicolas of Cusa, in the papal curia in Rome, of the Pla-
tonic demiurge in De docta ignorantia, written about 1440. Cusa wrote, “In 
creating the world, God used arithmetic, geometry, music, and likewise as-
tronomy. For through arithmetic God united things. Through geometry he 
shaped them….Through music he proportioned things in such way that there 
is not more earth in earth than water in water, air in air, and fire in fire” 
(II.13);6 in other words, nothing can be added, diminished, or altered for the 
worse. 
      In Book IV of De re aedificatoria, Alberti explained, “When you make 
judgments on beauty, you do not follow mere fancy, but the workings of a 
reasoning faculty that is inborn in the mind….For within the form and figure 
of a building there resides some natural excellence and perfection that excites 
the mind and is immediately recognized by it (IV.5).” Beauty depends on the 
archetypal Idea, as in the lineament, where proportions in matter correspond 
to mathematical and geometrical proportions in the mind, and beauty has the 
quality of concinnitas, that nothing can be altered for the worse.  
      In the Enneads of Plotinus, the Intellectual Principle, the divine intelli-
gence, holds and encompasses everything in one nature, as in the absolute 
oneness of the divine archetype, or concinnitas; but within the unity, the sev-
eral entities each have their own distinct existence (VI.6.7). Beauty itself is 
an embracing totality, forming a unity coextensive with everything, as the 
universe is a unity embracing all of the visible. Everything encompassed in 
the Intellectual Principle reproduces the Intellectual Principle in which it par-
ticipates, as Plotinus said, “every particular thing is the image within matter 
of a Reason-Principle which itself images a pre-material Reason-Principle: 
thus every particular entity is linked to that Divine Being in whose likeness it 
is made, the divine principle which the soul contemplated and contained in 
the act of each creation” (IV.3.11).7 The universe is composed of particulars 
which correspond to each other in appearance, and are fitted together with 
proportion and connection, all of which are essential to the whole, as in Al-
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berti’s concinnitas, where all parts are related to the whole. As Plotinus ex-
plained in the Enneads (VI.7.2), “In our universe, a coherent total of multi-
plicity, the several items are linked each to the other…” In Enneads I.6.1, 
matter without the incorporeal qualities of lineament is the Absolute Ugly, 
outside of Reason and Idea, which is transformed by the intelligences, or 
Ideal Forms, into a harmonious coherence and unity of cooperation, as in Al-
berti’s concinnitas. 
      Ficino’s definition of beauty is similar to Alberti’s definition in that 
beauty participates in the ordering of experience, as in concinnitas, and beau-
ty is a universal, divine principle. For Ficino, “Beauty is a certain grace 
which most often originates above all in a harmony of several things” (I.4).8 
According to Alberti, concinnitas seeks to “compose parts that are quite sep-
arate from each other by their nature, according to some precise rule, so that 
they correspond to one another in appearance,” as in Ficino’s harmony of 
several things. Grace arises from harmony in each of three types of beauty, 
depending on the quality of each in Ficino’s scala or hierarchy. As he wrote, 
“For from the harmony of several virtues in soul there is a grace; from the 
harmony of several colors and lines in bodies a grace arises; likewise there is 
a very great grace in sounds from the harmony of several tones” (I.4). 
      While Alberti defined concinnitas as “a harmony of all the parts…fitted 
together with such proportion and connection that nothing could be added, 
diminished, or altered for the worse,” so for Ficino in De amore, “the blessed 
is that which lacks nothing. And that is that which is perfect in every part” 
(V.1). Of the blessed there is an internal perfection which is goodness, the 
manifestation of the Good, and an external perfection, which is beauty. Phys-
ical beauty can lead knowledge to an intuition of the Good, as “those senses 
especially have to do with the beautiful which are the best avenues of knowl-
edge, namely, sight and hearing, as ministering to reason.” In matter, “a cer-
tain very temperate internal combination” produces an “external sparkle,” as 
harmonious proportioning. The internal composition of the soul may “dis-
play a certain very virtuous beauty in words, gestures, and deeds.” Thus 
beauty is a “certain blossom of goodness,” as a plant grows from the light of 
the sun, the sun being the equivalent of the Good. 
      Plotinus, in the Enneads, equated Beauty with the Good, from which is 
derived the Intellectual Principle, or divine intelligence, which is “pre-
eminently the manifestation of Beauty” (I.6.6). The Intellectual Principle 
shapes the beauty of things in the world of sense through the soul, which is a 
fragment of divine beauty. As for Ficino, every soul desires to ascend toward 
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the Good, beyond the world of sense and vision. Beauty for Plotinus also de-
pends on a harmony of parts where no part can be altered for the worse, as in  
Alberti. As Plotinus said, “This then is Beauty primally: it is entire and om-
nipresent as an entirety; and therefore in none of its parts or members lacking 
in beauty…” (V.8.8). 
      Since beauty for Ficino can be found in the virtue of the soul, as well as 
in bodies and music, then it must be a quality which is beyond the corporeal 
or particular, and cannot be a quality of the visual or aural alone. As Plotinus 
described in the Enneads, “If material extension were in itself the ground of 
beauty, then the creating principle, being without extension, could not be 
beautiful…” (V.8.2). That which pleases the soul for Ficino must be an in-
corporeal beauty. Beauty does not necessarily depend on a composite ar-
rangement, as it would appear in Alberti’s concinnitas, but simple things can 
be beautiful as well, including the soul. In De amore, “There are some who 
think that beauty consists in a certain arrangement of all the parts, or, to use 
their own terms, in symmetry and proportion, together with a certain agree-
ableness of colors” (V.3). Ficino does admit that “beauty of the body is noth-
ing other than splendor itself in the ornament of colors and lines,” and 
following that, “beauty of the soul also is a splendor in the harmony of doc-
trine and customs” (II.9). 
      While beauty is manifest in the proportions of soul, body and music for 
Ficino in De amore, in the end there is one beauty, which is God, and the de-
sire for God. As he wrote, “For it is the same God whose beauty all things 
desire, and in possessing whom all things rest. From there, therefore, our de-
sire is kindled” (II.2). Desire in the soul and body is desire for the universal 
and archetypal beauty in God. Such desire causes all motion, and it is kindled 
by the beauty in God as a spark from a flame. Ficino defined three types of 
beauty in De amore. The three types of beauty according to Ficino are beauty 
of the soul, beauty of the body, and beauty of music, which are three mani-
festations of one principle, or archê, as the members of the Trinity are three 
manifestations of the divine. Of the three types of beauty, “That of souls is 
known through the intellect; that of bodies is perceived through the eyes; that 
of sounds is perceived only through the ears” (I.4). As with Alberti, the har-
monies shared by the body and music are manifestations of the harmonies of 
the soul. 
      In the Music of the Spheres of Ficino, musica humana, inner, instrumen-
tal music, corresponds to musica mundana, cosmic, celestial music. The 
movement of the macrocosm and the planetary rhythms of musica mundana 
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are reflected in the soul in musica humana. Ficino explained in De amore, 
“Our soul was endowed from the beginning with the Reason of this music, 
for the celestial harmony is rightly called innate in anything whose origin is 
celestial, which it later imitates on various instruments and in songs. And this 
gift likewise was given us through the love of divine providence” (V.13). As 
explained by Plotinus in the Enneads, “…all music—since its thought is up-
on melody and rhythm—must be the earthly representation of the music 
there is in the rhythm of the Ideal Realm” (V.9.11). The visual arts must have 
been seen in the Renaissance as a talisman as well, an instrument to connect 
the harmony of the spheres with the harmony of the soul. In De pictura, Al-
berti wrote of painting that it “possesses a truly divine power” (II.25), and 
that “sculpture and painting originated together with religion” (II.27).9 
      Alberti, like Plotinus, saw physical beauty, in particular the proportions 
of the body, as communicating universal, archetypal beauty, in that “Beauty 
is a form of sympathy and consonance of the parts within a body, according 
to definite number, outline, and position, as dictated by concinnitas, the ab-
solute and fundamental rule in Nature,” as he explained in De re aedificato-
ria (IX.5). “When working in three dimensions, we should combine the 
universal dimensions, as it were, of the body with numbers naturally har-
monic in themselves, or ones selected from elsewhere by some sure and true 
method” (IX.6), according to Alberti. 
      According to Ficino in De amore, the beauty of the body depends on 
three things: “Arrangement, Proportion, and Aspect. Arrangement means the 
distances between the parts, Proportion means quantity, and Aspect means 
shape and color” (V.6). Vitruvius named arrangement or dispositione and 
proportion or analogia or eurythmia, as two of the six things of which archi-
tecture must consist, the others being order or ordinatione, symmetry, décor, 
and distribution, or oeconomia. Vitruvius defined Order as the arrangement 
of the proportion, which results in symmetry, which consists in dimension, 
the organization of modules or units of measurement. Arrangement is the as-
semblage of the modules to elegant effect, while proportion gives grace to a 
work in the arrangement of the modules in their context. Thus Ficino’s for-
mula for the beauty of the body is a condensed version of that of Vitruvius. 
For Alberti in De re aedificatoria, beauty is “a form of sympathy and conso-
nance of the parts within a body, according to definite number, outline, and 
position,” or “that reasoned harmony of all the parts within a body,” and “It 
is the function and duty of lineaments, then, to prescribe an appropriate 
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place, exact numbers, a proper scale, and a graceful order for whole build-
ings” (I.1), the building being a form of a body.  
      Plotinus, in the Enneads, used similar terms in defining physical beauty. 
He said, “Almost everyone declares that the symmetry of the parts toward 
each other and towards a whole, with besides, a certain charm of colour, con-
stitutes the beauty recognized by the eye, that in visible things, as indeed in 
all else, universally, the beautiful thing is essentially symmetrical, patterned” 
(I.6.1). Plotinus is more suggestive of Alberti’s definition of concinnitas than 
Ficino’s formula, when he expressed: “Only a compound can be beautiful, 
never anything devoid of parts; and only a whole; the several parts will have 
beauty, not in themselves, but only as working together to give a comely to-
tal. Yet beauty in an aggregate demands beauty in details…its law must run 
throughout.” Similarly, as Alberti wrote in De re aedificatoria, “It is the task 
and aim of concinnitas to compose parts that are quite separate from each 
other by their nature, according to some precise rule, so that they correspond 
to one another in appearance” (VII.4). 
      For Ficino in De amore, the qualities of Arrangement, Proportion and 
Aspect are not actually a part of the body, because they exist separately of an 
individual body, and thus belong to the lineament of the body, or the lines, in 
Alberti’s terms, rather than the matter. Ficino asked “But who would call 
lines (which lack breadth and depth, which are necessary to the body) bod-
ies?” (V.6). Arrangement entails spaces between parts rather than the parts 
themselves, and proportions are boundaries of quantities, which are “surfaces 
and lines and points,” or points, lines, and planes, which Ficino defined as 
the qualities of essence, being, and virtue in the Opera Omnia. Thus, for Fi-
cino in De amore, “From all these things it is clear that beauty is so alien to 
the mass of body that it never imparts itself to matter itself unless the matter 
has been prepared with the three incorporeal preparations which we have 
mentioned” (V.6), which exist only in the mind, as lineaments. 
      Through Arrangement, Proportion and Aspect, which are incorporeal 
qualities of the lineaments of matter or intelligences, which are copies of di-
vine ideas and principles, “both the heavenly splendor will easily shine in a 
body which is like heaven, and that perfect Form of Man which the Soul pos-
sesses will turn out more clearly” (V.6), Ficino explained. Arrangement, 
Proportion and Aspect are the perfect form which the soul possesses, the in-
nate idea of the body in matter. The same formula can be applied to music: 
Arrangement is “an ascent from a low note to the octave, and thence a de-
scent”; Proportion is “a proper progression through third, fourth, fifth, and 
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sixth intervals, and also full tones and half-tones”; and Aspect is “the sono-
rous intensity of a clear note” (V.6). 
      Marsilio Ficino described the power of creating mind in Five Questions 
Concerning the Mind: 
 
We cannot reach the highest summit of things unless, first, taking less account of the 
inferior parts of the soul, we ascend to the highest part, the mind. If we have concen-
trated our powers in this most fruitful part of the soul, then without doubt by means 
of this highest part itself, that is, by means of mind, we shall ourselves have the 
power of creating mind.…The motion of each of all the natural species proceeds ac-
cording to a certain principle...the limits of motion are two, namely, that from which 
it flows and that to which it flows. From these limits motion obtains its order.10  
 
Ficino divided the soul into the Higher and Lower. The Higher Soul or an-
ima prima is divided into two faculties, Reason or ratio and Mind, reason be-
ing directed toward corporeal perception, while Mind is directed toward the 
intellectus divinus or contemplation.11 The Lower Soul or anima secunda is 
biologically predetermined, by fate. It is composed of three groups of func-
tions relating to physiology, external perception and internal perception. The 
physiological functions are propagation or potentia generationis, nourish-
ment or nutritionis, and growth, or augmenti. External perception incorpo-
rates the five senses, the sensus exterior, while internal perception is an 
imaginative faculty which translates physical signals into psychological im-
ages, sensus intimus atque simplex and imaginatio. [20 min.] 
      In the Theologia Platonica, Ficino defined the elements in the hierarchy 
of being, in descending order, as Mind or mens, Soul or anima, Nature or 
natura, and Body or corpus. These elements are characteristics of both man 
and the universe. Mind is the first level below God, “incorruptible and stable 
but multiple, comprising as it does the ideas that are the prototypes of all that 
which exists in the lower zones.”12 The lower level of Mind is the Soul, 
which is “still incorruptible but no longer stable. Moving with a self-induced 
motion, it is a locus of pure causes rather than pure forms and, anthropologi-
cally speaking, dichotomous.” The Soul is dichotomous in that it incorpo-
rates the higher and the lower, reason and perception, idea and vision. The 
elements in the hierarchy of the soul belong to the elements of the spheres of 
the universe along with the planets.13 The universe is divided into four hier-
archies of descending perfection: Mind, Soul, Nature, and Matter. The realm 
of Nature is a corruptible, shifting world, and the realm of Matter is formless 
and lifeless. “It is endowed with shape, movement and even existence only in 
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so far as it ceases to be itself and enters a union with form, so as to contribute 
to the realm of nature,”14 that is, when it is endowed with the world soul and 
the good, and the light of the sun. 
      While the beauty of the body for Ficino in De amore “consists in the 
composition of many parts; it is restricted in place, it is subject to time” 
(VI.17). The beauty of the Soul, on the other hand, “suffers changes of time, 
of course, and contains multiplicity of parts, but is free from limits of place.” 
In order to see the beauty of the Soul, it is necessary to “take away from cor-
poreal beauty the weight of matter itself and the limitations of place”; as well 
as the “progression of time,” and the “manifold composition of Forms”; what 
is left is only simple form, which is the beauty of God; and the simple form 
is nothing other than light, the light of the sun, which is the source of all 
physical beauty. As Ficino wrote, “The beauty of all bodies is that light of 
the sun which you see, stained with those three things: multiplicity of forms 
(for you see it painted with many shapes and colors), the space of place, and 
temporal change.” What is left is a “brilliant light,” and a simple and pure 
light, which is “engraved with all the Reasons of things.”  
      The ray of beauty descends from the sun as God passes through the intel-
ligences and Souls, “as if they were made of glass” (VI.10) and into the 
body. From the body, the beauty of God “shines out, especially through the 
eyes, the transparent windows of the soul.” The beauty of God shines out 
through the eyes as light penetrates other eyes, and other souls, and kindles 
other appetites, as sparks of a flame. The vision of the eye is created by the 
light of the sun, which is the light of the divine intellect, as Plato described in 
the Republic, “though the sun is not itself sight, it is the cause of sight and is 
seen by the sight it causes” (508b).15 Vision is the physical manifestation of 
the Good, according to Plato, and divine intelligence. “The good has begot-
ten it in its own likeness, and it bears the same relation to sight and visible 
objects in the visible realm that the good bears to intelligence and intelligible 
objects in the intelligible realm.”  
      As Plotinus explained in the Enneads, vision is caused by light in the 
world of sense, but in the realm of the intellectual in the soul, vision occurs 
not through a medium but by its own light, which is a divine light shining 
within the soul which enlightens it and allows it to see (V.3.8). It is this di-
vine inner light, which allows the soul to perceive the Intellectual Principle, 
or the divine Idea. In this way a trace of the divine intellect can exist in the 
soul. The Intellectual Principle has “self-vision,” and in fact its very essence 
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is vision (V.3.10). It is a “multiple organ of vision, an eye receptive of many 
illuminated objects.” 
      For Ficino in De amore, “as the sun is to our eyes, so God is to our intel-
lects” (VI.13). As the world would be “sunken in eternal darkness” without 
the light of the sun, “the intellect would be empty and dark unless the light of 
God were present to it, in which it sees the Reason of all things.” While it is 
possible for sight alone to perceive forms and images, reason and intelli-
gence are only possible in the presence of divine light. Based on this, Ficino 
constructed a theory of vision as it is related to cognition, in that it is neces-
sary to construct in the mind what is perceived. Ficino explained vision and 
cognition as such in De amore: “When anyone sees a man with his eyes, he 
creates an image of the man in his imagination and then ponders for a long 
time, trying to judge that image. Then he raises the eye of his intellect to look 
up to the Reason of Man which is present in the divine light. Then suddenly 
from the divine light a spark shines forth to his intellect and the true nature 
itself of Man is understood” (VI.13). The image formed in the imagination 
corresponds to the lineament of Alberti; the spark shining from the divine 
light to the human intellect corresponds to Alberti’s concinnitas. It is clear 
that Ficino was influenced by Alberti in his concepts of concinnitas, armo-
nia, lineamenti, beauty, proportion, light, and vision. [25 min.] 
 
Ficino explained in De amore that, as light is sent out from the sun and in-
fused in intelligences or angels, souls and bodies, so sparks of light are sent 
out of the body, stirred by love, the desire for the Good, and the perpetual 
motion of the heart, through the eyes, which are like glass windows, trans-
parent and shining. Ficino pointed out that some animals’ eyes glow in the 
dark, as from an inner light, and if one is poked in the eye he will see a light 
in the inner eye. In the Enneads Plotinus explained, “At night in the darkness 
a gleam leaps from within the eye: or again we make no effort to see any-
thing; the eyelids close; yet a light flashes before us; or we rub the eye and it 
sees the light it contains. This is sight without the act, but it is the truest see-
ing, for it sees light whereas its other objects were the lit not the light” 
(V.5.7). For Plotinus it is the inner light which allows for the truest form of 
seeing, because it is a form of seeing not dependent on sense reality and ma-
terial things, so it is closest to the Intellectual Principle. Plato described the 
inner light in the Timaeus as well: “For when the eyelids, designed by the 
gods to protect the sight, are shut, they confine the activity of the fire within, 
and this smoothes and diffuses the internal motions…” (45).16  
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      In De amore, Ficino related that certain great men in history, like the 
Emperor Augustus, had a light so powerful in their eyes that it rivaled the 
light of the sun. Rays of light emanate from the eyes like the shooting of a 
dart, carrying a spirit or vapor, which penetrates the eyes and heart of another 
person. This can result in the bewitching of lovers, for example, and explains 
why some people who are not that physically attractive can excite an excep-
tional degree of love and passion and desire. Love can only happen when the 
eyes of two people meet. In the Enneads, Plotinus explained, “…it is pre-
cisely here that the greater beauty lies, perceived whenever you look to the 
wisdom in a man and delight in it, not wasting attention on the face, which 
may be hideous, but passing all appearance by and catching only at the inner 
comeliness, the truly personal” (V.8.2), as through the light of the eyes. Inner 
beauty can only be perceived by the soul which itself possesses inner beauty, 
as divine beauty can only be perceived by the soul which possesses the same. 
      In the Theologia Platonica, Ficino constructed a theory of vision. Rays of 
light projected by the sun emanate in the form of the cone of a pyramid if 
they pass through a small hole in a wall; similarly, as the rays of light from 
the sun pass through the hole in the pupil of the eye, they emanate in the 
form of the cone of a pyramid into the soul, corresponding to a lens or pineal 
gland, mirroring physical reality. In such a way the soul is able to judge 
measures and distances. The distance from the soul to the pupil must be the 
same as the distance from the sun to the pupil, which is why in Egypt, ac-
cording to Ficino, the soul was thought to be in the heavens. He explained, 
“The soul is equally distant from the eyes as the sun is above them. Thus, ac-
cording to the Egyptians, the soul is in the sky and the heavens, at the same 
distance above terrestrial eyes.”17  
      Alberti, in his treatise on painting, De pictura, constructed a theory of vi-
sion in which rays of light were arranged in a pyramid as well. According to 
Alberti, surfaces are defined and measured by rays of light which, as for Fi-
cino, serve to translate visual matter into intelligible matter, giving it the 
qualities of proportion and arrangement. Certain rays of light, which Alberti 
called “extrinsic rays,” define the outline, measure and dimension of sur-
faces. The extrinsic rays define the outline of the pyramid of light in vision. 
The pyramid is formed between the surface of the matter and the eye, which 
is, among other things, the source of an inner light. “The base of the pyramid 
is the surface seen, and the sides are the visual rays we said are called extrin-
sic. The vertex of the pyramid resides within the eye, where the angles of the 
quantities in the various triangles meet together” (I.7).18 Extrinsic rays of 
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light measure quantity, which is “the space across the surface between two 
different points” (I.6).  
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